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RECENT CASE NOTES
of it depended was that payment to the trustee should constitute a discharge.
Obviously, the primary function for which the set-up was designed was the
making available of more credit at lower costs, and the shifting of financing
risks to those organizations better equipped to handle them. Assuming that
the attainment of these objectives is promotive of general economic welfare,
the decision seems to be a desirable one inasmuch as it brings the law into
conformity with business needs.
J. M. C.
BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS-APPEALABLE ORDER.-The Federal Power Commission instituted an investigation of the ownership, management, and control
of respondent utility corporations. Respondents were directed to make their
books and papers available for examination by the commission's representatives. After a preliminary investigation the commission issued an order
setting a date for hearing to gain information on the question of control and
organization. In response to respondents' contention that the Commission
lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and of some of the persons, the order
was adjourned without day. During proceedings before the Commission to
determine its jurisdiction, respondents objected to evidence, alleging that it
was not relevant to the issue of jurisdiction but pertained to the subject matter
for which the original investigation was instigated. Upon the objections
being overruled respondents obtained a decree from the Circuit Court of
Appealsl directing the Commission that evidence be restricted to the issue of
its jurisdiction. On appeal, held, there was no reviewable order before the
court; therefore it had no jurisdiction to enter the decree. Federal Pover
Commission u. Metropolitan Edison Co. (1938), 304 U. S. 375, 58 S. Ct. 963.
The statutes concerning independent federal administrative agencies have
provided that a person aggrieved by "an order" may appeal to a designated
court. 2 This does not mean that any order regardless of its character may be
immediately reviewed by the courts. The functional aspect of the 6rderwhether administrative, legislative, or judicial-is an important factor when
judicial review is sought. Where purely ministerial or administrative action
of the commission is involved an appeal cannot constitutionally be allowed.S
On the other hand, the doctrine that legislation may not be reviewed by the
courts until there is a case or controversy seems to apply to administrative
orders. Thus, orders which promulgate general rules and regulations having
characteristics "of a statute may be reviewed when a particular individual
4
seeks to avoid compliance.

1 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Federal Power Commission (1938),
94
F. (2d) 943.
2Interstate Commerce Commission, 28 U. S. C. A. see. 41, subd. 28 "any
order;" Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. A. sec. 825L; Federal Trade Commission, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 45 (c); National Labor Relations Board, 29
U. S. C. A. sec. 160 (f) "final order;" Securities and Exchange Commission,
15 U. S. C. A. sec. 78y.
3"To admit the existence of a direct reviewing power in the courts would
violate the constitutional dogma of separation of powers," Dickinson, "Judicial
Control of Official Discretion" (1928), 22 American Political Science Review
275 at 282.
4 See "Appealability of Administrative Orders," 47 Yale L. Rev. 766. The
argument that a commission's action is strictly legislative would be met by
saying that it is invalid as an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The
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Even though functions exercised are of a legislative character the question
of lawful exercise of the power is a judicial question. 5 Review is often
sought without resort to the statutory appeal.
Several complainants have
sought to enjoin the proceedings of a commission, alleging that its action is
unlawful and burdensome because outside its powers.6 These attempts have
been unsuccessful because the courts will not use the extraordinary powers of
equity where an adequate remedy exists at law. This is found in the statutory
provision that the acts required of the parties must be enforced by a court
and not the commission. 7 In a collateral proceeding by the commission to
enforce its orders the court must find that they have been lawfully issued and
that the commission had power to act. 8 The question of jurisdiction 9 is
decided and the orders reviewed not as appeals, but because the establishment
of a valid order is a necessary prerequisite to enforcement by the court.1 0
This distinction is well illustrated in the consolidated cases of Jones v.
Securities and Exchange Commission.1 1 In the first case the court dismissed
a petition asking that the commission be enjoined from entering and enforcing
an order. In the second case, where the commission was seeking the aid of
the court to enforce the order, the court adjudged the order invalid and
enjoined the commission from taking further action.
Irreparable damage is often alleged to occur from burdens inflicted by an
investigation of a commission which is proceeding erroneously. Relief is
power to make general rules and regulations according to statutory authority
is generally upheld. U. S. v. Grimaud (1911), 220 U. S. 506, 31 S. Ct. 480. It
has also been said that prescribing rules for the future is an exercise of
administrative jurisdiction and thus not reviewable. Interstate Commerce
Commission v. United States ex rel. Campbell (1933), 289 U. S. 385, 53 S. Ct.
607. Other cases hold that orders made in an investigation in aid of the
legislative function are not reviewable as the statute contemplates review of
only those orders entered as an exercise either of the quasi-judicial function
of determining controversies or of the delegated legislative function of ratemaking and rule-making. United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake Ry. Co.
(1927), 273 U. S. 299, 47 S. Ct. 413; Brady v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1933), 43 F. (2d) 847, aff. 51 S. Ct. 559. (Query: Is the dictum
of these cases contrary to the case or controversy doctrine?)
5Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon (1912), 223 U. S.
118, 32 S. Ct. 224; Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond and
Mortgaging Co. (1933), 289 U. S. 266, 53 S. Ct. 627.
6New York 0. & W. Ry. Co. v. United States (1926), 14 F. (2d) 850,
aff. 47 S. Ct. 334; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. Ltd. (1938), 58
S. Ct. 459.
7 Supra, note 2.
8 Federal Trade Commission v. American Snuff Co., (1930) 38 F. (2d) 547.
9 Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (1936), 84 F. (2d)
97; Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission (1922), 280 F. 45;
MacFadden Publications v. Federal Trade Commission (1930), 37 F. (2d)
822; U. S. v. Illinois Central Ry. Co. (1917), 244 U. S. 82; 37 S. Ct. 584.
10 Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1915), 237 U. S. 435, 35
S. Ct. 645.
11 Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission (1936), 79 F(2d) 617,
certiorari denied in part and allowed in part, 56 S. Ct. 497. Judgment of
the Circuit Court of Appeals granting the petition for an order directing
Jones to submit to examination reversed, 56 S. Ct. 654.
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denied on the ground that such things are part of the social burden of living
under government. It is pointed out that a suit in equity would not wholly
obviate these burdens.12
Where the constitutionality of the statute is in issue there is some possibility
of obtaining judicial review before a final order has been issued. Prosecutions
have been enjoined where severe penalties for violations of an order of the
commigsion have been imposed by the act and there has been no opportunity
to test its validity.13 Some bases hold that this is not sufficient reason because
ample relief is afforded after a hearing is granted.14
Where the proceeding is judicial in nature the statutory remedy of appeal
must be followed. As already indicated, the courts have interpreted the
statutes so as to limit the orders that may be appealed. Thus, an order dismissing a complaint alleging demurrage rules repugnant to the act regulating
commerce was held not appealable because negative.' 5 This negative order
rule was f6und to be impractical so it was held that an order negative in
form was reviewable where it required affirmative action.1 6 The limitation
on appealable orders now appears to be that only final orders in the nature
of a judicial decision are appealable.1 7 Thus, protests filed to orders declaring
tentative valuation' 8 or even final valuationl 9 are not reviewable because
not final orders. But an order denying confidential treatment to filed information was held to be reviewable. The court said the order affected property
rights and was in the nature of a judicial decision. 20 To take jurisdiction
before a final order has been issued would in effect be drawing the court into
12Supra, note 9. In the Bradley Lumber Co. case the court said the
investigation was very likely to stir up feeling in labor and cause inconvenience,
but denied that it had jurisdiction.
13 Stafford v. Wallace (1922), 258 U. S. 495, 42 S. Ct. 397; Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Andrews (1910), 216 U. S. 165, 30 S. Ct. 286. The Federal
Power Act 16 U. S. C. A. sec. 825f (c) provides that any person who willfully
refuses to comply with the commission's order if he has it in his power to do so
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction be subject to a fine of one
thousand dollars. The Court said, "The qualification that the refusal must
be 'willful' fully protects one whose refusal is made in good faith and upon
grounds which entitle him to the judgment of the court before obedience is
compelled." 58 S. Ct. 963 at 968.
'4Lawrence
v. St. Louis, San Francisco Ry. Co. (1927), 274 U. S. 588,
47 S. Ct. 720; Mintz, "Suits to Enjoin the National Labor Relations Board,"
4 George Wash. L. Rev. 391.
15Procter and Gamble v. United States (1912), 225 U. S. 282, 32 S. Ct. 761.
1Alton Ry. Co. v. United States (1932), 287 U. S. 229, 52 S. Ct. 124,
discussed in "Jurisdiction of Court to review orders of Commission Negative
in Form;" 1 George Wash. L. Rev. 276.
17 Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission (1922), 280 F. 45.
18 Delaware and Hudson Co. v. United States (1924), 266 U. S. 438, 45
S. Ct. 153.
19 U. S. v. Los Angeles and Salt Lake Ry. Co. (1927), 273 U. S. 299, 47
S. Ct. 413.
20 America Sumatra Tobacco Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission
(1937), 93 F. (2d) 236. This case is adversely criticized in a note, "Judicial
Review of SEC decision denying confidential treatment to filed information,"
51 Harvard L. Rev. 159.
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the original proceeding. 2 1 Such action would burden the courts and take
away the advantages of regulation in specialized fields by independent adminis22
trative agencies.
The decision in the present case is in accord with the principle discussed
above. Whether the order complained of be considered legislative or judicial
in character, it is not directly reviewable. The respondents may obtain review
indirectly by refusing to furnish information and setting up the alleged unlawful
action of the commission as a defense in a suit by the commission to compel
the giving of the information asked.
E. 0. C.
CRIMINAL LAw-DOUBLE

JEOPARDY-DISMISSAL

AFTR

JURY

IMPANELED.-

Defendant was indicted by the grand jury, pleaded not guilty, and the cause
was submitted to a jury for trial. In his opening statement to the jury, the
defense counsel made remarks to the effect that the prosecuting witness, the
defendant's daughter, was under arrest and took the witness stand as an
unwilling witness. Defense counsel continued to make similar remarks after
being reprimanded by the court. As a result of these statements the court
discharged the jury. Later, the defendant filed his motion for a discharge
from further prosecution and from jail on the grounds that he had been once
placed in jeopardy and that the jury had been discharged without legal right
and over his objections. This motion was overruled, exceptions were duly
saved, and the court's action is assigned as error on appeal. Held, reversed.
Armentrout vJ. State (Ind. 1938), 15 N. E. (2d) 363.
It is an established maxim at common law that a man shall not be brought
into danger of his life or limb for one and the same offense more than once.1
This principle has been incorporated into the Constitutions of the United
States and of the various states, giving the maxim the added weight of a
constitutional guarantee. Where a legal indictment has been returned by a
competent grand jury to a court having jurisdiction of the person and the
offense, and the defendant has pleaded, and a jury has been duly impaneled
and sworn, and all the preliminary requisites of record are ready for the trial,
2
settled law in this state holds that the prisoner has been once put in jeopardy.
Under the strict practice which formerly prevailed the discharge of the
jury for any cause after the proceedings had advanced to such a stage that
jeopardy had attached, but before a verdict, was held to sustain a plea of
former jeopardy, and therefore to operate practically as a discharge of the
prisoner.B In deference, however, to the necessities of justice, this strict rule
has been greatly relaxed, and the-general modern rule is that the court may
discharge a jury without working an acquittal of the defendant, in any case
21 Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. Ltd. (1938), 58 S. Ct. 459.
In answer to appellant's contention that rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution would be denied unless the court had jurisdiction the Court said,
"The contention is at war with the long-settled rule of judicial administration
that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury
until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted."
22 Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co. (1927), 274 U. S.
160, 47 S. Ct. 160.
1 State v. Elder (1879), 65 Ind. 282, 32 Am. Rep. 69; Ex Parte Lange
(1875),
85 U. S. 163, 21 L. ed. 872.
2
Joy v. State (1860), 14 Ind. 139.
3 State v. Beal (1930), 199 N. C. 278, 15 S. E. 604.

